

Panel 2

**GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT PREVENTION**

Summary Notes  
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for the seminar

**PARTNERSHIPS IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION**

Promoting Equitable Development and Preventing Conflict  
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# **I Coherence as an Ideal and Incoherence as a Natural Condition Utopians versus Realists**

## **A. Satisfying Basic Needs as the *Sine Qua Non* of Coherence**

*“Conflict rises because certain needs felt by a particular group have not been recognized - or, if recognized, have been frustrated or not satisfactorily fulfilled.” (Roy 1990, 127)*

*“Out of the ruins and scattered debris of these (utopian) theories (of a perfect social order and a frictionless society composed of well-developed individuals) has now emerged, Sphinx-like, a new theory claiming to put an end to all theories by indicating how a perfect society of perfect individuals could be realized. This is human needs theory.” (Roy 1990, 125)*

*“Closing the basic needs gap is a more sensible and appealing objective than closing the income gap, and it should mobilize national and international support... it is physically and technically possible to meet the basic needs of the world population within the next generation.” (Sweeten 1981, 161)*

## **B. Incoherence is the Given Condition of Politics**

*“For realists, international relations theory fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common interests. Realist theory also argues that international institutions are unable to mitigate anarchy’s constraining effects on interstate cooperation. Realism, then, presents a pessimistic analysis of the prospects for international cooperation and of the capabilities of international institutions.” (Grieco 1993, 116)*

## II Locating the Issue of Governance

### A. When - the Ideal Future, the Persistent Past of the Redeemable Present

#### 1. Future - A Norm or Ideal

*It is a fundamental conception that social and economic development, democracy and 'good government' will ensure peace. But it does not necessarily follow that because these thoughts are universally known, they are universally valid. First of all, they are difficult to effectuate. Secondly, we do not know if they really would ensure peace if they were realized on a large scale. They are not primarily a statement about reality, but rather a norm, an ideology, or a myth." (Christensen 1995, 80)*

#### 2. Past - A Device for Elite Self-Preservation

*"'governance' has emerged as an old-order solution in the guise of new insight. I argue that the elaboration of a 'governance and development' paradigm is driven primarily as an exercise of elite institutional elite self-preservation responding to the threat posed by systematic breakdown. It is itself a symptom of the world crisis, not a true diagnosis much less a cure." (Schmitz 1995, 55)*

#### 3. Present - A Problem in Need of Repair

*"Good government is not feasible without properly functional institutions." (Larsson 1994, 78)*

## B. Where

### 1. On the Global Level

*“Our institutions of global governance are exceedingly weak. Indeed it is only a slight exaggeration to say that we have no effective institutions of global governance. The need for international action is large and the capacity to meet the need is small. Moreover the gap between needs and capacity is widening. In the economic sphere, the International Monetary Fund controls only about ten per cent of international liquidity, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade regulates only about seven per cent of global trade and the World Bank exercises negligible influence over global capital flows, most of its lending representing a recycling of earlier loans. In the political sphere, the Security Council lacks the means to impose its will, having neither a standing security force nor the power to raise revenues to obtain such a force.” (Griffin and McKinley 1994, p. 51)*

### 2. On the State Level

UNDP calls for honest government and the elimination of corruption since *“Corruption increases poverty in many ways.”* (UNDP 1997, 101)

#### TRENDS:

- escalation of the number and extent of intra-state wars
- shift from development aid to expenditures for humanitarian emergencies
- rising competition for non-renewable resources
- failed development, persistent economic decline and rising regional disparities
- structural adjustment programs increase potential for political conflict
- collapse of political institutions
- unresponsiveness of elites
- disproportionate reliance on electoral democracy
- vanishing foreign aid and political support

Cf. *Wider Angle*, 1:1996, The United Nations University

### 3. From the Global to the State Level

*“we are likely to see the extension and consolidation of a number of currently tentative regime norms linking aid allocation and concessionality more closely to economic performance and to programs focussed on food security, poverty alleviation, and sustainable development. In a context of increased competition for aid resources, graduation practices within the aid regime will likely be tightened, shifting countries sooner from more or less concessional aid and then to market mechanisms. As this process occurs, the increasingly aid-dependent majority of sub-Saharan African countries will become the main focus and challenge of the ODA regime. Neo-liberal prescriptions and conventional structural-adjustment programs seem increasingly irrelevant with respect to the desperate plight of these LLDCs....In sum, trends in economic assistance are likely to reflect two opposing tendencies: a more coherent focus on development, at least as aid donors define it, and an increasing use of other forms and purposes of aid whose relationship to development may be problematic. Ideally, the outcome will be a creative tension, spurring innovation and synthesis, but the potential exists for the kind of displacement of*

*development goals that too often occurred during the Cold War.*" (Wood 1996, 35)

### **III The Relationship of Development and Conflict Prevention**

#### **A. No Development without Conflict**

##### **1. Conflict Inherent in Development**

*"analysis of development has come to mean the study of the ways in which societies change from traditional to modern in terms of values and institutions"* (Seymour Martin Lipsett in the Preface to Raffaele 1971, vii)

##### **2. Development Aid as a Conflict Catalyst**

*"The regime's [Indonesia's] impressive development achievements have created a wholly new class of educated, increasingly mobile, urban, and informed people with greater expectations for political participation and less tolerance for autocratic or corrupt behavior on the part of government officials and agencies. The concentration of natural resource-based wealth in the hands of a small political-economic elite, in which the president's family is very prominent, is under growing attack from many parts of society. The power and conspicuous consumption of these elites - often ethnic-Chinese in league with members of the president's family and other regime figures - is increasingly unacceptable to a general public long suspicious of the country's wealthy Chinese minority, to the rising middle class which sees its own business prospects constrained by cronyism, and to elements within the military and civilian state elite itself who see the growing power and profile of the Chinese conglomerates and the 'kids' as obstacles to a smooth presidential succession, and as a potential source of general social unrest and political opposition...the New Order's capacity to adapt its policies to deal with these growing conflicts is weak, in contrast to the nimbleness of its macro-economic policy-making in recent years...Those policies have served the internal interests of the state well over the past three decades. And they have delivered sustained and broad-based economic and social development to the majority of Indonesia, although they have also been the cause of a great deal of oppression and suffering for some. But the regime now seems bereft of the ideas, mechanisms, and skills to adapt to the rapid changes engulfing the archipelago in the late 1990s."* (Barber 1997, pp. 6-7)

##### **3. Development is a Violence-Generating Process**

*"Development is a Violence-Generating Process, but Peace Comes in its Tail End."* *"The process of switching from imperial institutions, or their feudal legacy, to the growth-generating institutions of competitive markets operating in a multi-state system, is extremely violent, both within and between states."* (Howeling 1996, 145)

#### **Types of Violence**

- violence between emerging state and responding society
- state collapse violence
- low intensity primitive war to high intensity interrupted warfare

##### **4. The Failure of Development Results in Violence**

*Development is needed because there has been a “concentration of conflicts in the ‘Third World’ and the primacy of domestic sources of conflict” (Ayoob 1996, 67)*

## B. The Conflict Within Development Theory

### 1. Between the Third World and the First (though this observation is now somewhat dated)

*"welfare obligations inherent in Western welfare state or socialist doctrines, which are generally accepted in the developed countries, have a negative effect on economic growth and value change in the underdeveloped and traditional societies."* (Lipsett in Preface to Raffaele 1971, viii)

### 2. Welfare Economic Development

On the other hand, development assistance has itself undergone fundamental developments. For example, in the 1970s, when welfare economics was stressed (namely, wage and income policies, wealth redistribution, etc.) there was *"A new emphasis on wider employment, more equal income distribution and reduction of poverty will require new planning techniques, capable of giving expression to a social welfare function rather than a production function."* (Singer 1975, p. 21) .

### 3. Versus Structural Adjustment and the NEP (New Economic Policy)

*"A comparative analysis of the growth rate in various countries shows that the ability to maintain discipline in public spending, a comparative real exchange rate and a real interest rate that stimulates saving have been paramount factors...It is equally crucial for pricing mechanisms in the economy not to be inactivated...or distorted so that the domestic price structure in commodity markets deviates radically from the international price pattern....We know, too, that the countries performing best are those which give priority to the development of human resources, i.e. education and health care...At the same time, we know that countries that have developed large-scale state involvement in manufacturing industry, distribution, etc. in the form of state-owned companies and parastatals have usually done so in ways that entailed low or non-existent profitability."* (SIDA 1994)

#### Goals of structural adjustment (Larsson 1994, 98)

- create greater macroeconomic scope for reforms

- exert pressure on the recipient country's government to carry out the reforms

- provide technical assistance in developing institutions and building up capacity in the civil service

- cf. Rapley 1996, ch. 5. re the return of the state to neo-classical economic theory

- cf. Bienefeld 1995 and Sachikonye 1995

There is a conflict between economic goals and social/political development - structural adjustment and conflict.

## IV Connecting Violence, Good Governance and the New Economic Policy

### A.. Politics in the New Economic Policy

#### 1. The Primacy of the Political over the Economic in New Development Policy

*“these structural weaknesses of political institutions (engendered by the decay of traditional political, economic and social structures preventing the emergence of a social consensus), triggered by the continuing transformation, are the underlying causes of the ongoing wars.”*  
(Jung et al 1996, 62)

*“The most critical element in rebuilding post-conflict societies is political. An intra-state conflict indicates that the state has failed to govern itself - that is, to meet the essential needs and aspirations of its people and to effectively accommodate and reconcile the demands of competing groups within the framework of economic growth and political stability. In the absence of an effective and legitimate political authority, neither economic nor social rehabilitation are possible. Nor can further conflict and prevention be prevented.”* (USAID 1996)

*“Today, the political dimension may be said often to predominate in the debate and the research on structural adjustment.”* (Larsson 1994, 93)

Of course this is not a new observation:

For example, work on development said: *“political stability is a requisite of economic development, but politically stable regimes do not automatically produce economic growth. Moreover, authoritarian regimes can generate economic growth, but whether they can remain authoritarian and continue to grow is doubtful.”* (Raffaele 1971, 71)

#### 2. The Primary Political Programs

*“The most serious barrier to the promotion of reconciliation at the middle and grassroots levels is the fact that Angola is a divided country with very little travel permitted across the demarcation lines. Human contact across these borders could help build peace. In addition to free movement, both government and UNITA authorities must also permit free expression and free assembly if NGOs are to promote reconciliation effectively and if civil society is to emerge.”*  
(USIP 1996, 1)

The Programs include elections, human rights, legal systems, civilian security, refugee repatriation, military demobilization and resettlement (cf. RSP 1995 - cantonment, disarming, registration and transport back to home areas), reintegration of militants in the economy, judicial reckoning and truth commissions, media support, ethnic reconciliation (for the latter, cf. USIP. April 1996, *NGOs and the Peace Process in Angola*)



### 3. Economic Compensation of Victims of the NEP Necessary for Political Success

*“Today, the political dimension may be said often to predominate in the debate and the research on structural adjustment...groups gaining from the reforms should be identified and supported at the same time as influential groups losing from them should be compensated...Such compensation has, however, seldom been given and may also be counterproductive since it inherently involves incentives opposed to structural adjustment.” (Larsson 1994, p.93.)*

### 4. The People as the Primary Victims of Structural Adjustment Programs

*“Since 1987, Mozambique has followed the advice of the IMF, World Bank and western donors by implementing a market economy, curbing government spending, and privatizing many of the country’s parastatals. But the results have hardly been beneficial to Mozambique’s people...Most of the 500 companies that have been sold have been purchased by foreign companies. Housing utility costs have risen by 100 times more than rents and wages (which sic! Have drastically fallen in real terms.” (Mathias (95-96, p. 16) Many writers have connected structural adjustment and the impoverishment and neglect of the masses (Bond 1995)*

*“The 1980s were thus the years when budgets were balanced at the cost of unbalancing people’s lives. Human lives shrivelled in many regions, and among the most affected were women. Even in countries where adjustment worked, people felt that their lives had not improved significantly.” (UNDP 1995, 117)*

### 5. Women as Primary Victims of Structural Adjustment

For a gender based critique of structural adjustment theory, as supported by the World Bank, cf. Scott (1995), particularly Ch. 3.

### 6. The Irrationality of Structural Adjustment

*“NPE (New Political Economy) is so abstract it is as compatible with neo-liberalism as with Marxism...it remains one of the bitter ironies of the last two decades that so many of the poorest people in the world are forced to become even poorer, and in many cases to endure unspeakable suffering, through the imposition of Structural Adjustment Programmes justified in terms of ‘rational choice’.” (Leys 1996, 103)*

## B. Dilemmas in the PEOPLE Principles

P Participation  
E Equity  
O Ownership  
P Political Support  
L Law and Justice  
E Ethnicity

### 1. Participation

*“Nowadays, the topic of discussion is how structural adjustment can be reconciled with, and perhaps also made more efficient and sustainable, through political democratization.” (Larsson 1994, 94)*

*“In recent years, the structural adjustment programmes have become increasingly associated with **political conditionality**, ie, aid being made conditional on reforms of the political system. Here, it must be emphasized that the IMF and the World Bank have been and are still very restrictive in applying such conditions, which they believe are beyond their terms of reference. Furthermore, there are many people in these institutions who hold the view that democratization delays the economic reforms. Consequently, political conditionality has been demanded primarily by bilateral donors, with the USA often playing the leading role. This conditionality has played some part - varying from one country to another - in the introduction of multi-party systems.” (Larsson 1994, P. 95)*

### 2. Equity

*“its the fault of the Cold war since the needs of Third Worlders were neglected..The people in the former colonial regions were, as before, treated as objects and instruments during the Cold War, whose needs could not be taken seriously. Now their revenge is at hand. Whether in Bosnia or Burundi, Mexico or Morocco, those human beings whose needs and interests were effectively subordinated to an amoral and destructive version of the Thirty years War are now mobilizing and demanding their rights.” (Singer 1996, 48)*

*“groups gaining from the reforms should be identified and supported at the same time as influential groups losing from them should be compensated...Such compensation has, however, seldom been given and may also be counterproductive since it inherently involves incentives opposed to structural adjustment.” (Larsson 1994, 93)*

### 3. Ownership

*“The World Bank for its part has increasingly emphasized the political dimension and the necessity of the recipient countries ‘owning’ the programmes. But its political analyses have been very superficial, and ‘ownership has often been defined in terms of a very limited group in the country in question. Extending support for the programmes is also fraught with difficulties due to the Bank’s and, to an even greater extent, the IMF’s own procedures. All documents are, for example, confidential and often not even members of the government have seen the loan*

*documents or the conditions attached.*" (Larsson 1994, 94-5)

#### 4. Political Support

*"if these reforms are to become a reality, the government must be able to mobilize sufficiently broad political support for the reform process. The problems connected with structural adjustment in Nicaragua have their origins in the politically unstable situation. There is a risk of too rigid a policy on the part of the IMF and the international donor community being counterproductive."* (Larsson 1994, 97)

#### 5. Law and Justice

*"Conflict is a necessary complement of order. But order requires for its maintenance certain principles for claim recognition and adjudication of claim disputes. Some notion of justice has to be accepted for formulating such principles. This calls for uniformity. But uniformity itself then becomes a problem. It tends to rule certain needs out of court, or turn a blind eye to them. This again fosters conflict. The emphasis on justice, furthermore, militates against the notion of excellence inasmuch as justice demands equality and excellence calls for inequality."* (Roy 1990, 145)

#### 6. Ethnicity

##### a) Ethnicity as an Illusion and as the Key Reality

Jung et al asked rhetorically: *"Were there ethnic conflicts?"* *"But more profound examination of 'ethnic' conflicts shows that the fundamental causes of conflicts have not changed, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is still the process of nation-building and the fight for the distribution of scarce resources which form the fundamental issues of present wars and armed conflict."* (Jung et al 1996, 60)

#### VERSUS

*"The parcelling out of political and national structures in the Balkans was in a substantial part the product of such external forces. In this respect, the historical circumstances surrounding nation-building in the Balkans=s bear a close resemblance to those in which nations and independent national states have taken shape in other parts of the economically underdeveloped world."* (Ayoob 1996, 68)

##### b) Ethnicity and Nationalism as the Key Threat

*"Instead of considering the nationalists as the key to a potential solution, therefore, it is time that they were viewed for what they are, namely the problem, and treated accordingly...The nationalist cancer extends much deeper in Bosnian society than the leadership of the nationalist parties, and obstructionist officials are in positions of authority at all levels."* (OGI, Report 23, 1 May 1997, pp. 70-71)

c) Statism versus Ethnicity

*“the image of society as a melange of organizations cautions us not to jump to conclusions concerning the integration of society. It warns us, too, not to assume that conflict in society is marked by large-scale, integrated social forces, such as classes, or widely accepted frameworks for the rules of competition.”*

*“modern society has been marked by a common ideology among state leaders: to create a hegemonic presence - a single authoritative rule - in multiple arena, even in the far corners of society.” (Migdal 1996, 97;101)*

d) Democracy versus Ethnicity

*“The fundamental flaw (in the electoral process) is that candidates need only seek voted from one ethnic group to win office. Given the very recent experience of war, the prime factor motivating the electoral decision of almost all Bosnians is fear of the other two constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina to which they do not belong.” (ICG, 19 November 1997)*

*“The reconciliation of the two imperatives of consolidation of state power and democratization is not, and will not be, an easy task even if tremendous goodwill is present on all sides. Major tensions are bound to arise between state elites and their ethnic and political opponents who would like to put significant curbs on the power of the central state. In addition, where separatist insurgencies are already under way, major problems between separatists and democratizing central governments are likely to centre around two basic questions: What is the guarantee that groups espousing separatism will indeed surrender all arms and reconcile themselves to autonomous or semi-autonomous status that will continue to be essentially dependent upon the good faith and the continuing political sagacity of the central government? And what is the guarantee that central authorities, after persuading separatist ethnic groups to lay down their arms and thus having overcome immediate internal security crises, will continue to abide by their commitment to popular political participation, the constitutional protection of minority rights, and regional autonomy? ...In other words, the problem of reconciling the demands of state-making with those of democratization and human rights will have to be addressed much more creatively, and mutually acceptable solutions found, if the twin spectres of failed states and destructive ethno-nationalism are to be kept at bay....the imperatives of state-building and the demands for group rights and democracy may turn out to be irreconcilable.” (Ayoub 1996, 85)*

e) International Incentives to Impose Democracy in Ethnically Divided States

*“calibrated and phased set of pressures and incentives” in collaboration with key African and European states are required to create conditions for democratization. (USIP 1997)*

f) Nationalism versus Ethnicity

*“The combination of ethnicity and nationalism...has two facets. In its more constructive form as the instrument of national integration it gives greater depth to human civilisation and culture...On the other hand, it is the principal cause of internal disharmony and discord in the post-colonial worlds of South and South-East Asia and in the successor states of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia alike. It is also the most powerful source of irrational behaviour in*

*politics and rigidly uncompromising attitudes, whenever the issue of redress of historical grievances comes up. In most of these societies the past is a powerful presence and often carries with it painful memories of losses suffered and of territories lost. Ethnic consciousness in combination with nationalism raises expectations of attempts to preserve or restore the oast, to preserve the past and to transform it into something new, to create a new society upon ancient foundations.” (de Silva 1996, 123)*

## **V Humanitarianism and Development**

### **A. Facts, Values and Politics**

#### **1. FACTS: Humanitarianism and the Propensity to Hyperbole**

*“There must be an accurate and independent evaluation of the scale and nature of humanitarian needs. In Africa, humanitarian crises are rarely as severe as the relief agencies and media make out.” (de Waal and Omaar 1994, 7)*

*“The most successful fund-raising NGOs in many, if not most OECD countries use highly emotive techniques outweighing intelligent development education by a wide margin.” (Smillie 1993, 31)*

#### **2. VALUES: The Neutrality Principle**

*“‘Neutral’ intervention avoids engagement with the political reality it confronts. It eschews the need for supporting participatory and accountable structures and institutions, and arguably makes matters worse.” (Duffield and Prendergast 1994, 15)*

*“Professional neutrality is a myth at the best of times, but laughably so in Rwanda and donors need to prepare for this.” (Mthembu-Salter 1996, 14)*

#### **3. Humanitarianism Cannot be a Substitute for Politics**

*“Relief and development work do not happen in a political vacuum. In fact, emergency relief situations are often among the most politicized in the world.” (Anderson and Woodrow 1989, 39)*

*“There is a danger of just using humanitarian aid - Bosnia is the classic case of this - as a smoke screen to hide political failure.” (Duffield 1994, 23)*

*“Lessons learned: sponsoring parties must decide if they are taking sides in the conflict or intervening impartially.” (Newman 1996, 4)*

#### **4. The Use of Humanitarianism for Political Purposes**

*“The ERD’s (Emergency Relief Desk - an ecumenical consortium of NGOs to facilitate coordination of relief aid in the Horn of Africa) modus operandi was to work in partnership with indigenous relief agencies,” but as was widely admitted, indigenous relief agencies are usually part of ideologically and politically motivated movements. (Cf. Duffield and Prendergast 1994, 11)*

Thus, although donors use NGOs to link aid to peoples rather than to governments, both the indigenous NGOs and the working of the foreign NGOs are subject to political manipulation.. (Cf. Smillie and Helmich for an analysis of the conflict between NGOs and governments and the use of NGOs by governments.)

## B. Relief and Development

### 1. The Relief-Development Continuum

*“Relief policy in Africa has been shaped by development thinking. That is, taking note of limited public sector capacity, internationally-managed relief programs are asked to incorporate institution-building measures with the intention of handing them over to indigenous structures.”*  
(Duffield, 1994, 17)

### 2. The Primacy of Development over Relief

Smock (1996) advocates making long term development practices a condition of aid: improve planning, accurate assessments of needs, security for NGO personnel, and access to needy populations, long term aid over emergency relief, independent monitoring of assistance, local empowerment, close coordination with partners, deploy human rights monitors.

### 3. Massive Economic Assistance Required as a Condition of Development

A community-based approach to conflict transformation...requires a massive input of resources necessary for capacity-building in the field of conflict transformation and peacebuilding.  
(Lederbach)

### 4. Relief Costs Eating Up Monies for Development Aid

## C. Incoherence in Relief Aid Itself

### 1. Fudging Overhead Costs as a Competitive Advantage

World Vision overheads versus the fudging of others.

### 2. Competition for Relief Monies

*“Weak co-ordination is inevitable in a community of increasingly competitive players.”* (Smillie 1993, 23)

### 3. Competition Among Branches of the Same Agency

Competition between Oxfam Canada and Oxfam UK, or MSF - Australia versus Belgium in Zaire.

### 4. Competition Among Agencies in the Same Country

There is competition among myriad of NGOs that are Canadian and increasing proportion of support is required for the 2,900 full time employees. (Smillie 115)

## 5. Cultural Conflicts Between Agencies from Different States

Country cultural divergencies are reflected in their respective NGOs. *“Unlike Norwegian voluntarism, which sought to build a consensual society in an under-populated nation of small. Remote communities, American voluntarism was based on a rejection of government control and a resistance to consensus.”* (Smillie 1993, 17)

## 6. Conflict Between NGOs and the Government, their largest Supporter

*“NGO mistrust of government, and government mistrust of NGOs - not always misplaced - adds more bricks to the wall between them.”* (Smillie (1993, 16)

## D. Strategies for Improvement do not Address the above Fundamental Incoherences

Evaluation

Code of Ethics

Accreditation

Accountability

Research

Cooperation Among the Interveners

Rationale

- economics - NGOs cheaper
- citizen support over and above taxes
- pluralism - learning, innovation and knowledge
- more emergencies and quick response time

## E. No Learning from Competition

With government support, there has been growing homogenization. Therefore, uniformity without unity, and plurality without innovation and learning. (Smillie 1993)

# VI Conflict Management and Governance

## A. Conflict Management as a Condition for Humanitarian Relief

### 1. Refugee Warriors versus Refugees

Kent (1996) separate refugees from militants, move camps from borders, and create carrots - economic and legal

### 2. Relief versus Military Interveners



*“Military intervention has its own logic. The troops may go in because relief agencies call for them, but once there they follow commands from military structures, not relief agencies. Their operations are dictated by military strategy, which puts the military personnel as the first priority.” (de Waal and Omaar 1994, 7)*

**B. Focus on the Violence Prior to the Relief Versus Conflict Management as a Last Resort**

*“the proper focus of policy attention should be on ways to constrain military expenditures and the growth of military establishments, and on the nature of civil-military relations in the developing world. Three particular practical measures merit closer study: increasing the transparency in arms; acquisitions and security policies; linking security expenditures and international financial assistance; and promoting - under the rubric of ‘good governance’ - different patterns of civil-military relations.” (Krause 1995, 189)*

*“the extremely limited capacity of military intervention to cope with the underlying causes of a conflict or humanitarian disaster...Intervening parties have often been complicit in creating the humanitarian emergencies which intervention is now supposed to remedy.” (MER 1994, 1)*

**C. Relief Necessitates Military Intervention**

*“Humanitarian Intervention is often the consequence of inhumane immigration and refugee policies.” (MER 1994, 39)*

**D. Incoherence among the Interveners**

For a detailed case study, cf. Adelman (1997)

**1. Theoretical Incoherence**

*“peace enforcement as attempted by UNOSOM is a poorly constructed hybrid of collective security and peacekeeping...In addressing a new type of post-cold war ‘threat’ to international peace and security, the UN failed to build a coherent political-military strategy.” (Newman 1996, 3)*

**2. Incoherence over Time**

*“Mission goals in Somalia were constantly evolving and often contradictory.” (Newman 1996, 3)*

**3. Incoherence Among the Major Players**

*With respect to Central Africa, “There are two major obstacles (to developing policy coherence). The first is that they entail an acknowledgement and proper resolution of French, British, and to a lesser extent, Belgian interests in the region...a coherent policy that might work implies consideration of sovereignty and border issues.” (Mthembu-Salter 1996, 13)*



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